Does Jalen Green still fit what the Rockets are building?
After three years of aimless post-James Harden drifting in which they maxed out at 22 wins, the Houston Rockets have managed to regain their bearings and steer the ship back on course. At 18-18 and with the NBA’s fifth-ranked defense and 11th-best net rating, the Rockets have been the league’s most improved team so far this season.
Amid so many positive steps, there’s just one big, gnawing concern: Houston’s newfound has had very little to do with Jalen Green, the uber-athletic third-year guard and former No. 2 overall pick who once looked like the centerpiece of the team’s rebuild. Instead, the Rockets’ ascent has been propelled by the blossoming of center Alperen Sengun (taken 16th in the same draft as Green in 2021), the rapid growth of stretchy and switchy forward Jabari Smith Jr. (picked third overall in 2022), the two-way development of defensive ace Tari Eason (the 17th pick in Smith’s draft), and the arrival of veteran free agents Fred VanVleet and Dillon Brooks.
Putting the ball in the basket is supposed to be Green’s calling card, but his scoring is way down this season, from 23.6 to 20.9 points per 75 possessions. While that on its own isn’t surprising or damning given the way Houston restructured its offense around VanVleet and Sengun, the fact Green’s efficiency hasn’t ticked up at all in conjunction with reduced usage is cause for worry. Green is shooting 45% from 2-point range and 35% from deep. Even with a strong free-throw rate, he has a well below-average true shooting percentage (53.2%) that’s been trending the wrong way since his rookie season. The Rockets have performed about 11 points per 100 possessions better with Green on the bench.
He’s still a month shy of his 22nd birthday, and it would be foolish to render any judgments about what he will or won’t become. Green has tools you can’t teach, and he has shown some growth in important areas. At the same time, he’ll be extension-eligible at season’s end, so it’s fair to start wondering how or if he fits with Houston’s long-term vision. Given the incongruity between his pedigree as a top-two pick and how erratic the process and results have been for him through two-and-a-half seasons, it’s anybody’s guess how the two sides will approach contract negotiations.
Even with Kevin Porter Jr. gone and the Rockets ostensibly bringing in VanVleet for his ability to toggle between on- and off-ball duty, Green’s getting about 10 fewer touches and nearly a minute less time of possession per game than he did last season, per NBA Advanced Stats. That’s not a bad thing – Green is more effective when he starts possessions off-ball and gets touches on the move and in the flow than when he tries to initiate from a standstill – but it hasn’t been the smoothest adjustment.
Green still hasn’t figured out how to consistently assert himself in the offense as an off-ball threat, often drifting into the background (That’s especially true during crunch time when he has a microscopic 11.6% usage rate). And when he does get the initiating reins, he can overcompensate by trying to force the issue.
Green’s helium as a prospect derived from his elite burst, vertical explosiveness, and the possibility that he might one day fold those tools into a lead ball-handler skill package. We’ve yet to see that potential manifest as consistent positive NBA production. Despite his quick first step and leaping ability, Green’s shooting just 56% at the rim because he struggles to play through contact and his finishing lacks polish.
He’s also scoring just 1.01 points per possession in transition, a 29th-percentile mark that feels particularly frustrating given his athletic gifts. The open floor is the one place Green should thrive no matter the context, but he’s never been an above-average transition scorer, mainly due to shaky decision-making and court sense. He’ll often occupy lanes that are already filled, or fail to anticipate obstacles in his path:
It would obviously be beneficial if Green’s outside jump shot or in-between game showed progress. He’s at 33% on wide-open threes, 36% from floater range, and 32% from long mid-range. Being a real threat from those zones would dissuade defenses from closing out short and loading up on him at the basket the way they do now. Opponents are more than happy at this stage to concede long twos, and Green obliges far too frequently for someone who shoots them so poorly.
It would be even more helpful if passing out of the drive was a possibility the defense needed to account for. But Green’s ability to make reads on the move and in traffic remains frustratingly stunted. Out of 90 guards who’ve driven the ball at least 150 times this season, Green ranks 80th in assist rate and 82nd in turnover rate on those drives.
That doesn’t mean his on-ball game is a lost cause. Every game you’ll see flashes of how good Green can be as a self-created scorer. His straight-line speed gets him to the rim and line a ton. However, he’s starting to work some change-of-pace guile into that driving game, so opponents can’t just sit on his fastball. Green still has a ways to go on that front, but the seeds are germinating:
Green has a bully-ball streak he taps into when he has smaller guards on him. And he’s had success running inverted actions with VanVleet because opposing teams are reluctant to switch themselves into those mismatches. Green also manufactures a lot of separation with his step-back, and he’s been slightly better on pull-up threes than catch-and-shoots this campaign (He has comparable numbers on those shot types for his career, fluctuating between 33% and 35% on each from season to season). That feels more like an encouraging sign than discouraging. We’ve seen tons of players develop as spot-up shooters once they get to the league; not many show up with the ability to can 34% of their triples off the bounce.
Given that the Rockets are going to build around Sengun, perhaps it’s most important that Green and Sengun have developed some nice synergy in the two-man game, even if it comes in fits. The duo’s chemistry tends to look best when they’re playing give and go at the elbow, or when Green is playing pass and chase to get himself a head of steam:
The standard pick-and-roll stuff is less dynamic. Green eschews a lot of pocket passes, and the ones he makes usually come extremely early, delivering Sengun the ball around the nail without a huge advantage. Green sees almost exclusively drop coverage, but he rarely takes extra probe dribbles to fully engage the screen defender or see what else opens up. He almost never delivers skip passes to the weak side. It’s reminiscent of Zach LaVine, a player to whom Green has drawn comparisons. And it all points to Green best serving the Rockets in a hybrid role – similar to the one he’s in now – that leans more toward play finishing.
That’s a perfectly fine development track for a guard playing next to Sengun, but Green still requires a lot more skill and feel development to reach his potential in that role, as well as a lot of buy-in. The Rockets can work to create better shots for him, and he can work to create better shots for himself. They’ve had some success running a variation of split action in which VanVleet enters the ball to Sengun and then sets a wide pindown on the other side of the floor for Green to zoom into a handoff. Houston’s also recently tried using Green as a screener in double-drag actions and having him pop out to the 3-point line while Sengun rolls. But Green isn’t exactly an enthusiastic screen-setter, nor does he always pop out of those screens with pace or purpose:
His catch-and-shoot numbers need to improve (especially the open ones), but his theoretical utility as an off-ball player is about so much more than shooting gravity. Green has the potential to be an elite cutter, but he doesn’t access that skill set nearly enough. Fully formed, he could be one of the best off-the-catch attackers in the league.
Green has also shown real growth at the defensive end. He’s better at chasing over screens, more dialed in as a low man, and more diligent about busting back in transition. Green can still be pretty flat-footed when defending in isolation, he’s still in no way a defensive playmaker, and he’s a long way from being an above-average defender overall, but these strides still matter. While he’s pretty low down the list of reasons for the Rockets’ defensive turnaround as a team, they wouldn’t have gotten to this level if he’d continued to be as lost at that end as he was in his first two seasons.
All of these data points are vital. The Rockets don’t have to make any decisions just yet, but whether it’s extension talks this summer or restricted free agency a year later, those decisions aren’t far off. VanVleet has been a godsend for the Rockets but isn’t necessarily a permanent solution. His contract runs through next season, with a 2025-26 team option to follow, after which he’ll be a 32-year-old undersized guard seeking to cash in with one last big-money deal. Houston needs at least one guard to pop internally to complement Sengun and Smith long term.
Maybe that’ll ultimately be last year’s fourth overall pick, Amen Thompson, the toolsy point wing with superior vision and defensive upside. Ideally, for the Rockets, it would be both Thompson and Green reaching that level. But Houston probably won’t be able to pay all its young guys, and it’ll face tough questions about Green’s place in the future if his development continues to stagnate.
